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Abstract 
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and social reforms in the new EU member states, namely the flat income tax and private pension 
pillars. First, we look at the relationship between the political consensus/controversy at the time 
major policy reforms were passed and the future sustainability of these reforms after a change of 
government. Second, we explore what we call a paradox of reverse sustainability, whereby the flat 
income tax has been more politically resilient during the global financial and economic crisis than 
private pensions, even though ex ante expectations and the literature would lead us to expect the 
opposite. 
The paper shows that controversy at the time the reforms were passed had no effect on subsequent 
sustainability, and the levels of partisanship and public support with regard to a specific reform seem 
less important than the political costs and benefits. We also find that despite their apparent neoliberal 
bent, the two policies are versatile enough to be shaped towards a variety of policy goals, allowing 
their introduction and retention in a variety of economic and social circumstances. In other words, 
even though private pensions and particularly the flat tax have powerful political connotations, they 
are by no means policy straitjackets. 
While both reforms could sustain themselves throughout the ‘good’ times before the global crisis, their 
fates diverged during the crisis. Neither public support nor the large constituency of savers could 
fully protect private pensions from a policy reversal during a period of exceptional fiscal pressure. 
That is because a reversal was associated with significant, short-term fiscal gains and the states where 
these reversals took place also took a range of other decisions that were politically extraordinarily 
difficult. On the other hand, we demonstrate that the introduction or potential reversal of the flat tax 
was not associated with significant, short-term revenue gains. It is the relatively ‘cheap’ nature of the 
flat tax that distinguishes it from private pensions, because it sends a highly cost-effective signal in 
terms of revenues lost owing to its existence. 
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Why has the crisis been bad for private 
pensions, but good for the flat tax?  
The sustainability of ‘neoliberal’ reforms 
in the new EU member states 
CEPS Working Document No. 356/October 2011 
Miroslav Beblavý 
1. Introduction 
For governments in the developed world, pension and income tax policies are among the 
most important and politically sensitive social and economic issues. Both not only present a 
significant burden (or benefit) for any given individual in society, but also shape the labour 
market and investment decisions. At the macro level, the fiscal importance of income tax 
policy is obvious and pension expenditures are now the largest single individual 
expenditure of all governments in the developed world. Moreover, sending strong signals 
about the nature and extent of solidarity in a given society, both combine fiscal aspects with 
competing understandings of moral considerations.  
In Europe, one rarely observes paradigmatic reforms of either system in the Western half of 
the Continent. Despite much talk of welfare state retrenchment and occasional pre-election 
debates on the introduction of a flat tax, paradigmatic change as understood by Hall (1990), 
Kuhn (1962) or Masterman (1970) – involving, in our case, a wholesale replacement of 
existing pension or tax systems with new models – has not happened and does not appear 
likely. Instead, partial though sometimes far-reaching parametric reforms have been the 
preferred way forward.  
In contrast, the new EU member states have served as a veritable laboratory of social and 
economic change and policy flexibility. Much of it has been tilted towards ostensibly 
neoliberal, market-driven policies, such as the flat income tax or large-scale, compulsory, 
private pension savings. 
According to their critics, the flat tax and private pension reforms and the policy mix they 
represent could threaten the ‘European social model’, since they put pressure on the policies 
of old member states through ‘unfair’ tax and social competition (see Vaughan-Whitehead, 
2003 for the most detailed argument along these lines). Even though this is empirically 
untrue (Draxler & Van Vliet, 2010), it is also worth saying that while the new member states 
are in fact highly differentiated internally (Beblavý, 2009), the so-called ‘second pension 
pillar’ or flat income tax reforms (or both) have been introduced in nearly all post-
communist EU member states – the only country that has not introduced either is Slovenia. 
Therefore, the reasons these reforms were introduced and how the reforms have been able to 
survive politically in an otherwise quite varied landscape are of major interest, given that 
they have been nearly non-existent in the EU-15. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. 
First, we look at the level of political consensus or controversy at the time major policy 
reforms were passed and examine its relationship with the future sustainability of these 
reforms. Even a cursory reading of the political discourse reveals that these policies were 2 |  MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ 
 
sometimes deeply controversial at the time of their introduction, but passed anyway and 
have not been repealed after a subsequent change of government despite occasional explicit 
pledges to do so. 
Second, we explore what we call the paradox of reverse sustainability. Neither the private 
pension reforms nor the flat tax were repealed by the governments that came to power 
immediately after the reform. Yet the reforms introducing private pensions were, to a large 
extent, reversed in several countries in the 2008–10 period, during the global financial and 
economic crisis. While not formally abolished, they were severely cut in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland, and effectively aborted in Hungary. In Bulgaria, the attempt to 
partially nationalise private pension savings, which the parliament passed, was stopped only 
by the Constitutional Court. This creates a paradox, since it was the flat tax that had 
originally appeared more susceptible to reversal, given that it was more contested at the time 
it was passed and it created less path dependency in terms of public expectations and ‘rights’ 
than the pension reforms (see section 2 for the review of literature on the topic). Moreover, 
its abolition presents an electorally attractive option of redistribution (Bohn & Stuart, 2003).  
The rest of the paper is structured into five further sections. In section 2, we review the 
literature dealing with conditions for the introduction and sustainability of social and 
economic reforms in general, and pension and tax reforms in particular. Then we propose a 
methodological approach for our analysis in section 3. While there is a volume of literature 
examining the introduction of the economic reforms in the post-communist countries, this 
paper seeks to provide an evaluation of a number of factors and their impact on the long-
term sustainability of the reforms and fill the gap in the discussion. The methodology of this 
paper is based on the testing of two variables – the nature of public and political support, 
and a cost-benefit analysis of the policy reversal – and their role in the survival of the reform 
before and throughout the economic crisis of 2008 in the eight studied cases. Two core 
sections (4 and 5) presenting research findings in each of the two areas follow. Each of the 
two sections covers the introduction of the reform, the level of controversy and what 
happened when governments changed, the impact of the crisis, and finally analysis and case 
studies. In section 6, the paper concludes with a discussion that brings both strands together 
and summarises our findings. The findings show a relatively stable development of the 
market-driven tax and pension reforms even after a change of government to parties 
promising reversals in both areas. The changes in the private pension system occurred only 
during the economic downturn of 2008, owing to the short-term fiscal benefits of a policy 
reversal. 
2.  Pension and income tax systems and their reforms in Western Europe 
In this section, we briefly look at pension and income tax systems in the developed world, 
with a focus on their recent reforms (for a new discussion, see for example, OECD, 2011), as 
we need to place the reforms in new member states in the overall policy context.  
The complexity and multidimensional nature of pension system design lead to a variety of 
potential taxonomies (see Rhodes & Natali, 2003), but for the purposes of our paper, the 
distinction between systems with a dominant (or exclusive) public pillar and multi-pillar 
systems is the most relevant (Bonoli, 2003; Hering, 2006). Dominant public pillars tend to be 
pay-as-you-go systems (pensions are paid out of current revenue) and can be combined with 
additional supplementary systems for pension savings, but these are not essential to ensure 
the adequacy of pensions for recipients. This group includes inter alia Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Finland, Spain, Portugal, France and Greece (Hering, 2006). WHY HAS THE CRISIS BEEN BAD FOR PRIVATE PENSIONS, BUT GOOD FOR THE FLAT TAX? | 3 
Multi-pillar systems combine a smaller public pillar aimed at poverty prevention with 
individual savings in such a way that adequate pensions for most recipients can only be 
achieved by participation in both schemes (Bonoli, 2003). Multi-pillar systems come in two 
different models. In one, the savings option is occupational, frequently governed by 
bisectoral collective agreements and usually without a guarantee of universal coverage. The 
Netherlands and Denmark fall into this category, although both, and particularly Denmark, 
have been moving in the direction of universality. The other model is universal in both the 
pay-as-you-go and the savings pillars, as is the case in Sweden and to some extent the UK 
(Rhodes & Natali, 2003).  
All developed countries have undertaken some pension reforms over the last two decades, 
primarily in response to the impact of changing demographics (Barr, 2006; Hering, 2006). As 
Hering (2006) and Natali (2004) note, however, pension reforms in Western Europe have 
generally involved parametric changes within the same model. During the 1990s and early 
2000s, only Sweden, Italy, Germany and Austria switched from a dominant state pillar to a 
multi-pillar system, and even this is not as radical as it sounds (Hering, 2006). Only in 
Sweden did this involve the creation of a universal, private savings pillar of the type that we 
observe in the new member states. This pillar was quite small, comparatively speaking, with 
only 2.5% of contributions diverted to the savings option (Natali, 2004). In the other 
countries, governments created more space and support for (generally pre-existing) 
occupational pensions and cut pay-as-you-go benefits (Natali, 2004; Clark, 2006).  
The findings from Western Europe are relevant for the issues examined in this paper for two 
reasons. First, they illustrate path dependency and the resilience of the differentiated forms 
that welfare states take – ideas associated with Esping-Andersen (1990), Pierson (1994), 
Pierson (1995) and others. According to this view, choices made at a critical juncture can 
have difficult-to-reverse effects because massive constituencies coalesce around the new 
systems for whom any future changes would entail significant costs. Empirically, the 
organisational paradigms of the welfare regimes applied in individual countries tend to be 
very sticky (Myles, 1988; Marier, 2008). At the same time, even though welfare states in the 
industrialised countries of Western Europe and North America underwent significant 
changes during the 1980s and 1990s, frequently labelled as “welfare state retrenchment”, 
(Pierson, 1995; Castles et al., 2010), this rarely involved paradigmatic change. Castles’ 
analysis (2004) confirms the hypothesis that the welfare state is not losing its position and 
that the welfare regimes are still keeping their specific profiles (“steady state welfare state”) 
although there are some signs of convergence – a view confirmed by inter alia Ferrera & 
Rhodes (2000) and Sapir (2006). These differences between old and new member states make 
the paradigmatic change in the new member states all the more interesting to study and 
evaluate.  
Hering (2006) also notes that there have been no shifts from a multi-pillar to a dominant state 
pillar in Western Europe, a finding that has not changed despite the impact of the crisis. In 
this respect, again Western Europe differs from the new member states, where, as we show, 
the crisis has led several countries to either move from a multi-pillar system back to a 
dominant, state pillar system or cut the savings pillar to such an extent that it is debatable 
where on the borderline between the two systems they find themselves.  
Similar to pensions, income tax systems in the developed world present a bewildering 
variety of features. Still, historically – at least since the mid-20th century – these usually could 
be labelled ‘progressive’. Exceptions, such as Hong Kong, were too few, small and exotic to 
be of much interest. Progressive income tax has usually been interpreted as involving a 
multiplicity of rates for personal income tax, although it usually includes a single rate for 
corporate income tax. 4 |  MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ 
 
It is worth noting that income tax policy and its reforms are only an element of wider tax 
policy and changes therein. Since the 1980s, we can observe two major movements in tax 
policy for all OECD countries relevant for this paper. One is a general shift from direct to 
indirect taxes. The other is ‘flattening’ or lowering the income taxes (or both). As the OECD 
pointed out (OECD, 2009), this has been a continual process and even in the first decade of 
the 21st century it has persisted – with the top statutory rate of personal income tax (PIT) 
decreasing by 3.7 percentage points and the corporate income tax (CIT) rate decreasing by 7 
percentage points just between 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, the share of CIT in the 
total tax revenues has increased in most OECD countries owing to a combination of “base-
broadening measures, increased firm profitability as a result of globalisation (at least prior to 
the crisis) and greater incentives for businesses to incorporate” (OECD, 2010, p. 102).  
In this perspective, a flat income tax is a logical (or extreme, depending on one’s point of 
view) conclusion of this process. Nevertheless, even though its introduction has been 
discussed in the election campaigns of several major economies (e.g. in the US in 1996 and 
Germany in 2006), it has not been introduced in any Western European country or any non-
European OECD country.  
On the other hand, post-communist countries ranging from Russia and Georgia to the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Slovakia have actually introduced a flat income tax in the last two 
decades. Conceptually, a flat income tax can be interpreted in a variety of ways, but the most 
common refers to a personal income tax that has a single tax rate – all income is taxed at the 
same percentage rate (Keen et al., 2006). As we analyse in more detail below, practical 
application usually includes two important features (Keen et al., 2006): 
•  there is a de facto 0% tax rate for income below a given threshold introduced through 
an allowance/deduction that is not taxable; and 
•  in most though not all cases, the tax rate for the personal income tax is made equal to 
the tax rate for corporate income tax (which is already generally ‘flat’ in most 
developed countries). 
The shift from direct to indirect taxes and the flattening of the income tax distribution appear 
to be driven by a combination of an ideological shift and the impact of globalisation (as well 
as European integration in the case of EU countries) (Inotai, 2000). Yet existing literature on 
the political economy of tax reform (e.g. OECD, 2010) would give more grounds for 
scepticism rather than optimism on the adoption and sustainability of a completely flat 
income tax. Politicians are motivated to focus on attracting “swing voters” and particular 
groups (Profeta, 2003), leading to “incremental tax reforms that target specific groups and try 
to create winners without making losers…such as tax expenditures” (OECD, 2010, p. 109). As 
Bohn & Stuart (2003) point out, the role of the median voter implies tax redistribution from 
lower and upper-income taxpayers to the median taxpayer – the opposite of flat income tax 
reforms. The literature also emphasises a number of factors militating against a radical 
paradigmatic change in tax policy: 
•  ex ante uncertainty about distributional impacts and the risk aversion of taxpayers 
(Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991); 
•  the political process may not be conducive to tax reform, owing to coalition 
governments and the resulting higher number of veto points (Ashworth & Heyndels, 
2001); and 
•  the collective action problems can be particularly acute in tax policy, with special 
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influencing tax policy to block the implementation of tax reform (Olofsgard, 2003), 
especially in the legislature (Bird, 2004). 
The literature thus leads to the following conclusions: 
•  flattening the income tax structure has been a long-term trend in developed countries, 
but it is not clear why only the new member states have taken the leap to a completely 
‘flat’ income tax; and 
•  once instituted, the flat tax is subject to selective pressures that could, over time, erode 
it. 
3. Methodological  framework 
While there is a significant body of literature examining conditions under which major 
economic reforms are introduced (a good summary is provided by OECD, 2010), much less 
attention has been paid to factors affecting their sustainability. A good intellectual starting 
point is the Dewatripont–Roland model (Dewatripont & Roland, 1992, 1995), according to 
w h i c h  t h e  d e s i g n  o f  r e f o r m  p a c k a g e s  t r i e s  t o  incorporate costs of reversal that are high 
enough to deter political resistance (see also Cukierman & Tommasi, 1998). Wyplosz (1993) 
and Kim & Pirtilla (2006) conclude that the level of public support influences not only the ex 
ante political constraints, but also the ex post aspect, i.e. political sustainability. The literature 
(which is still relatively scarce) is based on analysis of a large number of countries and the 
overall reform progress. It is also rather general in nature. Therefore, our framework for 
analysing the sustainability of contested reforms reflects these findings, but fleshes them out 
based on the specific issues related to the two areas we examine: 
•  the level of initial public support and the level of partisanship related to the reform as 
evidenced by 
−  popular support, 
−  the positions of political parties, and 
−  the ideological uniformity/heterogeneity of the parties introducing the reforms; 
and 
•  the costs and benefits of policy reversal, decomposed into 
−  the political costs and benefits (interest groups, path dependency), and 
−  the fiscal costs and benefits (short-term costs/benefits, level of fiscal pressure on 
the government). 
Based on the literature, we can hypothesise that the level of initial public support and the 
strength of partisanship related to the reform should be correlated with the reform’s 
sustainability. Reforms that are more contested in public opinion or ‘owned’ by one part of 
the political spectrum and opposed by the other should have a smaller chance of survival. 
This should apply comparatively – i.e. comparing the fate of the same reform among 
countries, but also comparing different types of reforms.  
We measure the level of controversy based on a combination of publicly available 
information about the position of the public and the political parties towards the reform 
during the reform and in the run-up to the subsequent elections. When a high level of public 
support was combined with the support (or at least acquiescence) of major political parties 
and interest groups, we consider the reform to demonstrate a low level of controversy. When 
the popular or political reaction was more mixed, but there were no explicit promises of 6 |  MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ 
 
reversal by the opposition parties, this was coded as a medium level of controversy. When 
the opposition as well as some of the major interests (usually trade unions) were opposed 
and the opposition explicitly promised major changes, then we see the reform as highly 
controversial. We also examine the ideological hues of the governments that introduced each 
reform to see whether there was an ideological bias.1 
In our framework, the costs and benefits of policy reversal are divided into political and 
fiscal elements. In the political arena, we examine costs and benefits by looking at both the 
pre-existing positions of key interest groups before the reform was introduced and at any 
lock-in effects of the reform after its introduction – through, for example, the creation or 
empowerment of new interests. With regard to fiscal costs and benefits, we look at short-
term fiscal costs/savings resulting from a particular reform and the overall level of 
immediate fiscal stress of the government, which mediates how politically important the 
short-term costs or savings are. 
4. Introduction  and  sustainability of compulsory private pensions 
The second pillar reforms within the Central and Eastern European context are an important 
element of liberal changes in economic and social policy, as they mean a partial privatisation 
of the public pension system. The introduction of a compulsory, private pension pillar to 
complement the existing, public, pay-as-you-go system has been part of the formal World 
Bank pension strategy since 1994. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have 
generally been most responsive to the Bank’s argument that such an approach  
allows a distinction to be made between poverty reduction and income 
replacement goals; it builds risk diversification into a country’s provisions for 
retirement income support; it minimizes the burden of fiscal transition while 
preserving many of the economic gains of the fully-funded approach; and it 
brings to the reform discussion some clear gains for younger workers and those 
who are facing labour income losses from globalization (Holzmann, 1999). 
The size of the pillar can differ dramatically, however, and the introduction of the pillar can 
have regressive as well as progressive consequences in terms of income redistribution effects, 
depending on the balance between the second pillar and the publicly provided, pay-as-you-
go system (the first pillar), and particularly depending on the nature of the first pillar 
pension formula. In Central and Eastern Europe, except for the Czech Republic and Slovenia, 
all the countries have privatised parts of their pension systems, but their size differs. (The 
Czech Republic is currently in the process of creating a second pillar, but the legislation has 
not been passed yet.) Using the yardstick of what percentage of the gross wage is diverted to 
private accounts, the systems were intended to be large enough to make them multi-pillar, 
with the private pillars being larger than those found in the multi-pillar systems of Western 
Europe. Even so, they were not expected to completely replace the public pay-as-you-go 
systems, as was the case with several Latin American reforms.  
Table 1 presents key information on the introduction of the second pillar in eight new EU 
member states and its political economy. As we can see, the private pension pillars were 
introduced during the decade between 1998 and 2008, though generally prior to EU 
accession. 
                                                      
1 In our analysis, we generally omit the role of international institutions even though they played an 
important part in the introduction of the second pillar (not the flat tax), since their role in the 
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Table 1. Summary of information on the second pillar reforms in Central and Eastern Europe 
Country Year  the  2nd 
pillar was 
introduced 
Planned size 
(% of gross 
wage) 
Govt 
composition 
Level of 
controversy of 
2nd pillar 
introduction 
Year when 2nd pillar 
opponents entered 
the government and 
the consequences 
Hungary 1998  8% 
(increasing 
from 6%)  
Centre-left High  1998  (Fidesz),  freezing 
increases in the size of 
contributions at 6%, 
temporary opt-out 
from the 2nd pillar 
until 2002  
Poland 1999  7.20%    Centre-right  Low  – 
Bulgaria 2001  5% 
(increasing 
from 2%)  
Centre-right  Medium  2001, no consequences 
Estonia 2002  6%  Centre-right  Low  – 
Latvia 2001  10%  – 
reached 8% 
before the 
2009 cut 
Centre-right Low  – 
Lithuania 2004  5.5%    Centre-right  Low  – 
Slovakia 2005  9%  Centre-right High  2006  (SMER-SD), 
allowing a temporary 
opt-out 
Romania 2008  6%  by  2016 
(increasing 
from 2%) 
Centre-right  Medium  No major change of 
government yet 
Source: Author’s compilation, using data from the World Bank and European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development. 
Ideologically, there is a clear pattern of the reform being introduced by governments right of 
the centre, the only exception being the Hungarian 1998 reform. (Even in the Hungarian case, 
the ostensibly centre-left 1994–98 government introducing the reform was, on the whole, 
characterised by sustained attempts at liberal reforms in all areas as a solution to the 
country’s long-lasting fiscal problems.)  
Based on the methodology presented above, we analysed the level of public and partisan 
controversy surrounding the pension reform (see Table 1). We find that the introduction of 
the private pensions was, in most cases, not politically contested. Let us now analyse the 
consequences of controversy where they existed. In the two countries with a medium level of 
controversy, either nothing happened (Bulgaria) after the subsequent change of the 
government or there has not yet been a change of government to the parties criticising the 
reform (Romania). Two countries with a high level of controversy – Hungary and Slovakia – 
are subject to a more detailed analysis. 
In Hungary, we draw information primarily from Simonovits (2009). The second pillar was 
introduced in 1998, six months prior to the parliamentary elections, by a government 
dominated by post-communist Socialists, but also containing Liberals. The reform diverted 
contributions worth 6% of the gross wage into private accounts (to be increased to 8% by 
2000) in exchange for a loss of 25% of the first pillar pension. Entry into the system was 
completely voluntary for everyone already in the labour force and mandatory for new 
entrants.  8 |  MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ 
 
The conservative opposition party Fidesz heavily criticised the system and pledged to 
abolish it after the election. Once elected, it chose not to do so to avoid political controversy 
in light of the popularity of the new policy (see below), instead taking three different steps: 
•  freezing the contribution rate at 6%, 
•  allowing individuals to return to the mono-pillar system until 2002, and 
•  making participation in the multi-pillar system voluntary even for new entrants.  
The second pillar proved to be extremely popular, particularly among younger people. 
Among workers, 81.2%, 83.8% and 75.9% in age brackets 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34 respectively 
decided to join. Even the significant decrease in the attractiveness (caused by the 6% instead 
of 8% contribution rate without a corresponding change in the 25% loss of the public 
pension) coupled with a major political attack on the new system by the government did not 
cause a significant exodus from the multi-pillar system.  
After the 2002 election, the Socialist–Liberal government returned, increasing the rate to the 
originally planned 8% and making participation for new entrants mandatory again. 
In Slovakia, we base our analysis on Žitňanský (2009). The second pillar was introduced as 
part of the overall overhaul of the pension system in 2005 by a centre-right coalition, 18 
months before parliamentary elections. It entailed exchanging the loss of 50% of the public 
pension for diverting 9% of the gross wage in contributions to the individual accounts. The 
entry was voluntary for all workers, but mandatory for new entrants.  
The main opposition party SMER, which used its animosity towards the overall social and 
economic policy of the government as its main political platform, was particularly critical of 
the second pillar. It saw the second pillar as a way of weakening the state and handing over 
public money to private pension funds. Its election manifesto promised to abolish the second 
pillar by making it completely voluntary. After the election, SMER became the core of the 
new government and continued its attacks on the second pillar by  
•  enacting two temporary ‘return windows’ in 2008 and 2009, when people could return 
to the mono-pillar system; and 
•  making participation in the multi-pillar system voluntary even for new entrants.  
It also repeatedly hinted at reducing the contribution rate from 9% to 6%, but has not done so 
yet.  
The Slovak private pillar, despite less attractive conditions, proved to be comparably popular 
to the Hungarian case. Again among workers, 87.6%, 86.4% and 89.5% in age brackets 20-24, 
25-29 and 30-34 respectively decided to join.2 
Therefore, the level of controversy and partisanship had no measurable effect on the initial 
sustainability of the second pillar reforms.  
Shifting now to political costs and benefits – from a fiscal point of view aborting or cutting 
the second pillar would bring an immediate fiscal benefit. The stability and growth pact 
means that the transition costs of the second pillar (due to the fact that while contributions 
are diverted to private savings, current pensions still have to be paid) are calculated into 
fiscal deficits. In other words, second pillar reforms make the implicit debt in the pay-as-you-
go pillar into an explicit, immediate fiscal deficit and debt. This resulting situation is that 
                                                      
2 These percentages are slightly overstated, as the rules also allowed certain groups of non-working 
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even though the pension reforms introduced in Hungary and Slovakia will reduce public 
debt in the long run, they increase the fiscal deficit in the short- to medium-term period. 
Thus the abolition or reduction of the private pension pillar would mean a relaxation of 
immediate fiscal constraints.  
Therefore, one needs to answer the question of why – even in countries where all of these 
factors would militate against the sustainability of the private pensions – they have survived 
a change of government with only minor adjustments. Their survival can be primarily 
ascribed to the path dependency and resilience of the welfare state outlined in section 2. The 
case of the second pillar shows that this path dependency logic can also be applied to liberal, 
privatising reforms when they create a politically important constituency – in this case, 
millions of voters who have entered the second pillar. Of course, this sustainability is 
predicated on the initial and continuing enthusiasm of these voters for the second pillar. 
Public support was demonstrated even in countries with a high level of controversy, such as 
Hungary and Slovakia. One should also bear in mind the relative weakness of the interests 
fighting against the second pillar, particularly trade unions in post-communist countries. The 
trade union density in Hungary and Slovakia is 17% and 22% respectively (Kohl, 2008) and 
the pattern is followed everywhere else in the region (11-22% for the new member states 
with the notable exception of Slovenia, which has a density of 44%). Even these numbers do 
not paint the full picture of trade union weakness. Until 1990, membership had been 
compulsory. The numbers for the trade union density therefore reflect inertia to some extent, 
which decreases their mobilisation powers. For example, in Hungary there was a decrease of 
46 percentage points (from 63% to 17%) between 1995 and 2008, while in Slovakia there was 
a decrease of 35 percentage points (from 57% to 22%) over the same period – the highest 
declines among the post-communist new member states (Kohl, 2008). 
Additionally, subsequent governments faced only limited fiscal pressure. After 1998, 
Hungary enjoyed a period of high economic growth and declining unemployment, as did 
Slovakia after 2006. Among the countries with a medium level of controversy, we can only 
analyse the case of Bulgaria, where the period after 2001 was also associated with an 
economic upswing. This is likewise true for countries where private pensions were 
uncontroversial (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). 
In the end, it was the advent of the global financial and economic crisis that changed the 
political calculus. It was not the case that the costs and benefits related to interest groups and 
path dependency suddenly changed. There is no evidence of a change in the popularity of 
the second pillar among the wider population.  
The extreme fiscal stress associated with the global crisis created a new reality in several new 
member states, in which major cuts in the second pillar were suddenly possible. Table 2 
shows the extent to which the private pensions were downsized in nearly all the countries 
that have them. In Hungary, the private pensions were effectively abolished and existing 
savings nationalised. In Estonia, all payments were suspended for two years and cut by 50% 
in the following year. In Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, the pillar was cut by 60% to 75%. 
Only in Romania and Slovakia were the changes minor or absent. In the Czech Republic, 
which is currently passing legislation to create the second pillar, the size of the contribution 
diverted from social security contributions should be small and should involve matching 
funds from individuals. 
If sustained, these are not just parametric changes. Even though a much smaller, private 
pillar survives, it can no longer serve as an equal or significant addition to the public system. 
Instead, it becomes a small supplement, which means that the entire pension system reverts 
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Table 2.  Policy changes in the second pillar and other areas as a consequence of the fiscal stress 
caused by the global financial and economic crisis 
Country  Changes in the size of 
the 2nd pillar during the 
crisis 
Other changes in pensions, taxes and public sector 
wages 
Bulgaria  The nationalisation of 
savings from individual 
accounts of older 
workers (passed in 
parliament) was 
declared illegal by the 
Constitutional Court 
Increase of the retirement age for both men and women 
from 63 and 60 respectively to 65 by 2026 (starting 2017) 
Increase of employer (from 8.9% to 10%) and employee 
(from 7.1% to 7.8%) contributions; increase in the number 
of contribution years required from 37 to 40 years by 2020 
(2011) 
Public sector wages and jobs cut by 10% (2010) 
Estonia  From 1 June 2009 to 31 
December 2010, state 
contributions to funded 
pensions were 
suspended  
In 2011, the 
contributions were 
resumed on a 1+2% 
basis  
In 2012, the initial 2+4% 
system is expected to be 
restored* 
Increase of the pension age from 63 for men and 60 for 
women to 65 (starting 2017, finishing in 2026) (2010) 
Increase of the maximum unemployment insurance 
contributions for both employees (from 2% to 2.8%) and 
employers (from 1% to 1.4%) (2009) 
Public sector wages cut by 8% 
Increase in the VAT rate from 18% to 20% (2009) 
Latvia  Reduced from 8% to 2% 
in May 2009 with a plan 
to gradually return to 
6% by 2012 (not 
adhered to) 
Increase of the retirement age for both men and women 
from 62 to 65 by 2021 (starting 2016) 
Reduction of early retirement pensions from 80% of the 
normal retirement pension, to 50% of the normal 
retirement pension (2008) 
Abolition of early retirement as of 2012 
Public sector wages cut by 15-50% 
Increase in the VAT rates: the standard rate rose from 18% 
to 21%, the reduced rate rose from 5% to 10% (2009), and 
further increased to 22% and 12% respectively (2011) 
Lithuania  Reduced from 5.5% to 
2% (as of 2011) now 
Proposes that if an 
individual is willing to 
put in an additional 2%, 
the government will 
match that voluntary 
amount; the plan is to 
go to 6% for 2012–14)  
Increase of the retirement age for both men (from 62.5) 
and women (from 60) to 65 by 2026 (2011) 
Temporary reduction of pensions above LTL 650 by ca. 
5% (2010–11) 
Public sector pensions cut by 11% 
Public sector wages cut by 8-10% (2010) 
Increase in the VAT rate from 18% to 19% (2008), further 
increased to 21% (2009) WHY HAS THE CRISIS BEEN BAD FOR PRIVATE PENSIONS, BUT GOOD FOR THE FLAT TAX? | 11 
Table 2. cont’d 
Hungary  Suspension of payment, 
quasi-nationalisation 
and automatic 
withdrawal from the 2nd 
pillar with a mandatory 
opt-back 
Increase of the retirement age to 65 for men by 2018 and 
for women by 2020 (starting 2012) 
Increase of the employee pension contribution from 9.5% 
to 10% (2010) 
Abolition of the 13th pension 
Freeze of nominal gross salaries and family allowances for 
two years (2009-10) 
Abolition of the 13th wage for public sector jobs 
Increase in the standard VAT rate from 20% to 25% (2009) 
Poland  2.30% (reduced from 
7.20% as of 1 May 2011; 
starting in 2013, 
contributions will 
gradually increase to 
reach 3.50% in 2017) 
Freeze of public sector wages, reduction of public sector 
jobs by 10% (2011) 
Increase in the VAT rates: the standard rate rose from 22% 
to 23%, the reduced rates rose from 3% and 7% to 5% and 
8% respectively (2011) 
Romania  Minor – postponed a 
planned increase in 2nd 
pillar contributions in 
2010, but has begun 
raising the contribution 
rate in 2011 
Reduction of pensions and unemployment benefits by 
15% (2010) 
Increase in the retirement age to 65 for men and 63 for 
women (2010) 
Overall increase in contribution rates from 27.5% to 31.3% 
(2008) 
Reduction of wages in the public sector by 25%, lay-offs of 
public workers (2010) 
Increase in the VAT rate from 19% to 24% (2011) 
Slovakia  No change  10% wage fund cut for some groups of public sector (2011) 
Increase in the VAT rate from 19% to 20% (2011) 
* See “Pension System in Estonia”, on the Estonia.eu website (http://estonia.eu/about-
estonia/society/pension-system-in-estonia.html). 
** See the Investment in Pensions in Europe website (http://www.ipe.com/news/vast-majority-of-
hungarys-second-pillar-members-return-to-state-system_39050.php); see also “Hungary: The second 
pillar of the pension system survives in a stripped down form”, on the OSW (Centre for Eastern 
Studies) website (http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2011-02-02/hungary-second-pillar-
pension-system-survives-a-stripped-down-form). 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
On the other hand, it should also be noted that these developments do not invalidate 
arguments about the path dependency as presented above: 
•  These steps were taken under extreme financial stress, when the governments had to 
undertake a whole set of radical measures that would also be unthinkable under 
normal circumstances. A list of such measures is shown in Table 2. The only country 
where there was no change whatsoever was Slovakia, the sole government in the 
sample not to undertake any fiscally restrictive measures during the crisis. 
•  Reversals tried to avoid formal abolition of the pillars and ‘only’ decreased their size, 
in most cases ‘temporarily’. So far, the temporary reversals have been extended 
completely or to a large extent. 12 |  MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ 
 
5.  Flat income tax and its surprising survival 
Between 1994 and 2011, eight out of the ten post-communist EU member states introduced a 
flat income tax (see Table 3 for details). In the process, the flat income tax has become a 
powerful political symbol of liberal economic policies. In reality, the flat tax can take many 
different forms disguised under the same label. The tax rate can be the same or different for 
corporate and personal income taxes. The reform can consist of a fundamental tax reform or 
simply unify rates within the existing framework of the tax system. Very importantly, the 
rate itself can vary – in our sample of countries it has ranged from 10% to 33%.  
Table 3. Basic information on the introduction of the flat income tax 
Country  Date of reform adoption  Tax rates before reform  Tax rates after reform 
   CIT  (%)  PIT (%)  CIT (%)  PIT (%) 
Estonia 1.1.1994 above  26  16-33  26 26 
Lithuania 1.1.1995  29  18-33  29 33 
Latvia 1.1.1997  25  10 and 25  25 25 
Slovakia 1.1.2004  25  10-38  19 19 
Romania 1.1.2005  25  18-40  16 16 
Bulgaria  CIT 1.1.2007, PIT 1.1.2008  15  10-24  10 10 
Czech 
Republic 
1.1.2008 24  12-32  22 15 
Hungary 1.1.2011  10  and  19  17 and 32  16 (in 2013)  16 
Note: The rates cited as ‘after reform’ are the rates immediately after the reform and many have changed 
since then. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Similar to pension reforms, the flat tax was generally introduced by centre-right 
governments or governments that mixed parties from both sides of the political spectrum – 
only in Lithuania was the flat tax introduced by a government dominated by the left. Unlike 
the pension reforms, the flat tax was generally controversial, and in many countries, even 
highly unpopular at the time of its introduction. Table 4 shows the detailed data. In five 
countries (namely Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, the Czech Republic and Hungary), the level of 
controversy was considered high, with significant social resistance and opposition 
statements about its abolition after election victory. In no case was it initially uncontested.  
Therefore, one cannot look for the explanation of flat tax sustainability in a high level of 
public support or a low level of partisanship. On the contrary, based on these indicators, the 
sustainability of the flat tax seemed significantly lower than in the case of private pensions. 
Nonetheless, none of the new governments have abolished the flat tax. Indeed, subsequent 
changes in the flat tax until the crisis were generally in the direction of lowering the tax rate 
rather than making the system more progressive. Specifically, in the Baltic countries, there 
was a lowering of the tax rate. There were no substantial changes in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary or Romania, except for those already enacted at the time of passage. In 
Slovakia, changes were undertaken to increase the progressivity of the income tax, but 
within the intellectual framework of the flat tax: in 2007, the government introduced a higher 
tax for high-income workers by abolishing the basic allowance for high earners, but 
preserving the 19% rate for PIT and CIT. 
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Table 4. Political opposition towards the flat tax 
Country Ideology  of 
government 
implementing 
the reform and 
year of the 
reform 
Level of 
controversy 
View of the 
main 
opposition 
party 
Subsequent government 
       Year of 
appointment 
Ideology 
Estonia Centre-right 
(1994) 
High Strongly 
negative 
1995 Centre-left 
Lithuania Centre-left 
(1995) 
Medium Negative  1998  Nationalist-
centre-right 
Latvia Broad  coalition 
(1997) 
n.a. n.a.  1996  Conservative-
liberal 
Slovakia Centre-right 
(2004) 
High Strongly 
negative 
2006 Nationalist-
centre-left 
Romania Centre-right 
(2005) 
High Negative  2008  Different 
composition of 
centre-right  
Bulgaria  Mixed: left + 
liberal (2007) 
Medium Negative  -2009  Centre-right 
Czech 
Republic 
Centre-right 
(2008) 
High Strongly 
negative 
2010 Centre-right 
Hungary Right  (2011) High  Strongly 
negative 
n.a. n.a. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Looking at the costs and benefits of policy reversal (prior to the crisis), the political economy 
of the tax policy with regard to the median voter should work against a flat tax, as analysed 
in section 2. The explanation for its survival lies in a combination of the two remaining 
factors: strong signalling effects and low potential fiscal benefits of policy reversal.  
Introduction of the flat tax served as a powerful symbol of the overall turn towards more 
market-oriented economic policies. To understand this, let us use an analogy with an older, 
more widespread and better-researched phenomenon – central bank independence. Maxfield 
(1997) finds that politicians use central bank independence to signal creditworthiness to 
foreign investors and counterparts. McNamara (2002) presents a sociological argument that 
delegation is based on the symbolic properties of central bank independence – “signalling 
agreement with a broader series of economic management principles and conveying 
credibility to external audiences about the economic and political character of a government” 
(p. 67). This view is shared by Cukierman et al. (2001) as a reason for the high level of central 
bank independence granted by transition countries to their monetary policy-makers. Hetzel 
(1990) argues that the degree of central bank independence depends on the country’s 
commitment to a free market economy based on voluntary exchange coordinated by the 
price system, open competition for control over resources and a stable set of property rights. 
An independent central bank is, in this view, a bulwark of the market economy and limited 
government involvement.  
A similar logic seems to operate for the flat tax, which “has commonly – almost universally – 
been adopted by new governments anxious to signal a fundamental regime shift, towards 14 |  MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ 
 
more market-oriented policies. In several cases, the signal appears to have been well-
received” (Keen et al., 2006, p. 37). This argument is stronger for the ‘second generation’ flat-
tax reforms introduced in the 2000s in Central Europe and the south-east Balkans than the 
‘first generation’ Baltic states in the 1990s, where flat taxes were introduced with relatively 
high rates.  
A subsequent reversal of such a policy would send an explicit signal that the government is 
going to deviate from a pro-investment and pro-business economic policy. While such a 
signal might be mildly welcome by parts of the electorate, the political gain would probably 
be dwarfed by the political losses resulting from the worsening of the perceived business and 
investment climate. As Drahokoupil demonstrates in his 2009 book on Globalization and the 
State in Central and Eastern Europe, all new member states with the exception of Slovenia 
gradually converged on the model of a “competition state” with an extremely high share of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in key sectors of the economy (Drahokoupil, 2009). In such an 
environment, the importance of external signalling cannot be overstated. For the organised 
interests opposing the flat tax (i.e. trade unions), abolition of the flat tax would be a welcome, 
but non-essential measure, relatively low on the priority list. Trade unions prefer to focus on 
measures strengthening their own position (labour market legislation) or ‘positive’ measures 
for their favoured social groups (higher benefits, public sector salaries), etc.  
The flat tax also does not tie the hands of the government in the ways imagined by some of 
the public choice proponents of the system (Brennan & Buchanan, 1977), since the system is 
flexible enough for governments to impose their policy preferences without losing the signal 
mentioned by Keen et al. (2006). We have already demonstrated that the flat tax as a policy 
idea is primarily a matter of political packaging rather than a distinct piece of economic 
policy. For example, a study on the impact of introducing the flat tax in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia on labour taxation came to the conclusion that the flat tax meant a reduction in 
the labour income tax wedge for an overwhelming majority of workers. At the same time, 
the study showed that it increased rather than decreased the differences between the 
treatment of labour and capital income despite an identical tax rate (Beblavý & Prousková, 
2010). Similarly, the World Bank showed that an actual flat income tax can be even more 
progressive than the previously implemented “progressive” income tax, as in the case of 
Slovakia (World Bank, 2005).  
From a fiscal point of view, a subsequent reversal of the flat tax would not have significant 
fiscal benefits. This is shown in Table 5. By the time the flat tax was introduced, the revenue 
from taxes on income and wealth ranged from 5 to 9% of GDP, compared with more than 
13% for the old member states.  
The fact that the introduction of the flat tax was not responsible for the lower revenue is also 
documented by a comparison of countries that later introduced a flat tax with post-
communist countries that did not. The future ‘flat-taxers’ had revenue from income and 
wealth taxes of 8.9% of GDP in 1995 and 7.9% of GDP in 2008, but the countries that never 
introduced the flat tax (Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) saw a nearly identical decline from 
8.9% of GDP to 8.3% of GDP. In 2009, the revenues in flat tax countries declined more 
precipitously, but this was related to the greater effect of the global crisis on Baltic and 
Balkan countries than on Central Europe. 
In other words, it was the transition and not the flat tax that was associated with a significant 
decline of revenue from income taxes over the medium term. A similar picture emerges from 
a comparison of the share of income in public revenues, which is not presented here in the 
interest of brevity. Therefore, transition led to an increasing gap between EU member states 
from Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe in terms of revenue raised from 
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flat income tax. Rather, the explanation seems to lie either in the declining capacity of the 
state to extract revenue following the liberalisation of the economy or a conscious policy to 
stimulate growth and investment regardless of whether the policy took shape in a flat tax.  
Table 5. Current revenues from taxes on income (% of GDP) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
BG 9.4  8.1  8.7  8.1  8.3  8.0  8.6  9.0  9.5  9.5  9.1  9.1  9.4  7.9  7.3 
CZ 9.4  8.1  8.7  8.1  8.3  8.0  8.6  9.0  9.5  9.5  9.1  9.1  9.4  7.9  7.3 
EE 10.9  9.2  9.2  10.3  9.7  7.7  7.2  7.5  8.0  7.9  7.0  7.1  7.6  7.9  7.5 
HU 8.4  8.8  8.5  8.5  9.0  9.4  9.8  9.8  9.2  8.7  8.7  9.1  9.9  10.2  9.5 
LV 7.1  7.0  7.5  8.0  7.7  7.1  7.4  7.6  7.3  7.7  7.7  8.3  8.8  9.5  7.0 
LT  8.3  7.9  8.7  8.9  9.1  8.4  7.8  7.4  7.9  8.7  9.0  9.6  9.2  9.3  6.0 
RO 10.6  9.8  9.5  8.3  7.3  6.4  5.8  5.4  5.7  6.1  5.1  5.7  6.4  6.4  6.3 
SK 8.0  7.0  6.9  6.5  5.8  4.9  4.9  4.7  4.9  4.3  4.4  4.6  5.2  5.9  5.2 
Average 8.9  8.4  8.5  8.4  8.1  7.3  7.4  7.2  7.3  7.3  7.0  7.3  8.0  7.9  6.8 
PL, SI  8.9  8.9  8.8  8.7  7.2  6.9  6.8  6.9  6.9  6.9  7.4  7.9  8.4  8.3  7.4 
EU-15 13.1  13.6  13.9  14.1  14.1  14.5  14.2  13.7  13.4  13.3  13.6  13.9  14.0  13.8  13.2 
Note: The red shaded square indicates the year in which the flat tax was introduced. In Estonia, the flat tax was 
introduced in 1994, so it is outside the scope of the data. In Hungary, the flat tax was introduced in 2011, so 
it is also outside the scope of the data. 
Source: Eurostat. 
We can also examine the immediate impact of the introduction of the flat tax by comparing 
revenue from income taxes in the year before the change with the two years following the 
change. The results – presented in Table 6 – are that the introduction of the flat tax is, on 
average, associated with no measurable drop in revenue as a % of GDP in the following two 
years. Instead, we can see that for some countries, the introduction of a flat tax was 
associated with significant revenue increases (Bulgaria and Latvia), while for others it 
involved revenue losses (the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia).  
Table 6.  Revenue from current taxes on income and from social security contributions as a % of GDP 
before and after the introduction of a flat tax  
 Income  tax  revenue  Social security contributions 
  Year n-1  Year n  Year n+1  Year n-1  Year n  Year n+1 
Bulgaria  4.7 7.6 6.1  8.3  8.1 7.8 
Czech Republic  9.4 7.9 7.3  16.3  16.2 15.4 
Latvia  7.0 7.5 8.0  10.8  10.6 10.8 
Romania  6.1 5.1 5.7  9.7  9.8 9.8 
Slovakia  4.9 4.3 4.4  10.0  9.9 9.9 
Average 6.4  6.5  6.3  11.0  10.9 10.7 
Note: The data exclude Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania due to data unavailability; however, given the very 
high revenues in Estonia and Lithuania after the introduction of a flat tax, it is unlikely their inclusion 
would decrease the post-introduction revenue. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Eurostat. 
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The ability of new member state governments to use income tax as a cheap signalling device 
is reinforced by the imbalance between income tax revenue and social security contributions. 
While on average these are roughly equal in Western Europe, oscillating at around 13% of 
GDP, Table 6 shows that they play a much more important role in the new member states 
introducing the flat tax, with nearly double the income coming from social security 
contributions.  
As we saw in the section on pensions, the crisis brought radically increased fiscal pressures. 
Yet this did not lead to an abolition of the flat income tax; on the contrary, Hungary 
introduced it in 2011 as a part of its recovery package. A shift to a progressive income tax 
was discussed in Baltic countries, but in the end they opted either for a further decrease in 
the tax rate (Lithuania) or a partial reversal of previous cuts in the tax rate (Estonia and 
Latvia). In other countries, no significant change occurred. One could argue that, with the 
exception of Slovakia, flat tax countries were generally governed by centre-right parties 
during the crisis and that the ideological argument could explain why the flat tax survived. 
The same fact did not prevent reversals in the second pillar, however. The difference appears 
to be the continuing combination of a potent signalling of a ‘competition state’ and the low 
potential fiscal benefits of policy reversal.  
6.  Synthesis and conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined two questions related to the sustainability of major, 
neoliberal, economic and social reforms in the new EU member states, namely the flat 
income tax and private pension pillars. First, we have looked at the relationship between 
the political consensus/controversy at the time major policy reforms were passed and the 
future sustainability of these reforms after a change of government. Second, we have 
explored the paradox of reverse sustainability, whereby the flat income tax has been more 
politically resilient during the global financial and economic crisis than private pensions, 
even though ex ante expectations and the literature would lead us to expect the opposite.  
Table 7 shows a stylised summary of the effect of various explanatory factors on the 
introduction/sustainability of private pensions and a flat income tax based on findings from 
the previous two sections. We have assessed the effect for three periods – introduction, a 
change of government and the crisis. The picture is stylised in the sense that we are 
synthesising the experience of nine countries over different periods of time, so we are 
drawing out the common themes and findings rather than taking full account of each 
individual story. 
The table shows that controversy at the time the reforms were passed had no effect on the 
subsequent sustainability, and that the level of partisanship and public support with regard 
to a specific reform seem less important than the political costs and benefits.  
Both reforms had strong constituencies in their favour. For private pensions, it was the 
millions of individuals who voluntarily entered the savings system. For the flat income tax, 
the constituency was the domestic and particularly the foreign business and investment 
community, to which the new system sent a strong signal about the overall government’s 
economic and social policy mix. The position occupied by this constituency should be 
evaluated in the light of the extremely important role played by FDI in the developmental 
strategy of the Central and Eastern European ‘competition state’. On the other hand, trade 
unions as the major opponents of both changes in several countries have been weak and 
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Table 7.  Influence of various factors on the introduction and sustainability of private pension and flat 
tax reforms 
   Pensions  Income  tax 
   Introduction  Change 
of govt 
Crisis Introduction  Change 
of govt 
Crisis 
Partisanship/
public 
support 
Ideology of 
government 
+ -  +  + -  + 
 Level  of 
controversy 
0/- 0/  0/-  -  -  - 
Political costs 
and benefits 
Interests/ 
path 
dependency 
0 +  +  + +  + 
 Fiscal 
benefit/cost 
- -  -  0 0  0 
 Fiscal 
pressure 
0 0  +  0 0  + 
Sustainability   n.a.  High  Low-
medium 
n.a. High  High 
Note: + means a positive influence on introduction/sustainability, – means a negative influence, 0 means no or an 
insignificant influence 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
We have also found that despite their apparent neoliberal bent, the two policies are versatile 
enough to be shaped towards a variety of policy goals, allowing their introduction and 
retention in a variety of economic and social circumstances. In other words, even though 
private pensions and particularly the flat tax have powerful political connotations, they are 
by no means policy straitjackets.  
While both reforms could sustain themselves throughout the ‘good’ times before the global 
crisis, their fates diverged during the crisis. Neither public support nor the large constituency 
of savers could fully protect private pensions from a policy reversal during a period of 
exceptional fiscal pressure. That is because the reversal was associated with significant, 
short-term fiscal gains and the states where these reversals took place also took a range of 
other decisions that were politically extraordinarily difficult. At the same time, we have 
demonstrated that the introduction or potential reversal of the flat tax was not associated 
with significant, short-term revenue gains. It is the relatively ‘cheap’ nature of the flat tax 
that distinguishes it from private pensions, because it sends a highly cost-effective signal in 
terms of revenue lost owing to the existence of the reform. 
Overall, we can see that these reforms have been politically sustained by factors that made 
them politically attractive in the first place. With the exception of the lock-in effect created by 
ownership of their private savings in the pensions, other factors contributing to the 
sustainability of the liberal economic policies in the new EU member states were also present 
at their introduction.  18 |  MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ 
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